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I. INTRODUCTION
The typical collective bargaining agreement (CBA) requires just cause
for discipline or discharge of employees. The typical CBA also provides a
grievance and arbitration procedure as the exclusive method for resolving
disputes over the agreement's interpretation and application. A significant
portion of discipline and discharge arbitrations involve employees terminated
or otherwise disciplined for poor attendance. Typically, an employer will
have an attendance control plan that assesses points for each occurrence of
poor attendance, such as absence, tardiness, early departure, and failing to
call to notify the employer of an absence or tardiness. As successively more
points are accumulated, the employee is subject to successively more severe
forms of discipline, beginning with a warning and progressing through
suspension and discharge.
When a union grieves an employee's discharge under an attendance
control plan and the grievance proceeds to arbitration, it is generally accepted
that prior discipline imposed on that employee under the plan which was not
grieved is not subject to attack in the discharge proceeding. Thus, the focus
of the discharge is the employee's record since the prior suspension; efforts
to litigate the prior suspension are generally rejected.1 This is not a rule of
law, in the sense that a court will reverse an arbitrator who disregards it, but
it is a settled expectation of the parties and, as developed below, the
prevailing decision-making ethic of labor arbitrators is to follow the probable
expectation of the parties.
Assume, however, that the prior suspension, although not grieved, arose
from the assessment of occurrence points for absences that were clearly
t The authors wish to acknowledge very helpful comments from Daniel Hamilton
and Michael Scodro and the very capable research assistance of Stephanie Brinson,
Chicago-Kent College of Law class of 2005. Professor Malin also wishes to acknowledge
financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent. © 2005
Martin H. Malin and Jeanne M. Vonhof.
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** Arbitrator, member of the National Academy of Arbitrators; Adjunct Professor,
Indiana University.
1 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 985
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covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).2 Assume further that
although the time for filing a grievance challenging the prior suspension has
long expired, the FMLA limitations period for filing a lawsuit has not.3 How
should the arbitrator balance the traditional expectations of the parties with
the public law under the FMLA?4
In this article, we explore the evolving role of the labor arbitrator with
respect to the parties' expectations and public law external to the collective
bargaining agreement. Part II sets forth the traditional role of the arbitrator as
an instrument of the parties' system of workplace self-government and who,
accordingly, is subject to the parties' control and bound by their expectations.
Part III chronicles the expansion of public regulation of the workplace that
began in the 1960s and the debate among arbitrators that arose commensurate
with the expansion of public regulation concerning the impact of such
"external law" on the arbitrator as an instrument of the parties. Part IV
analyzes more recent developments that may have rendered that debate moot.
Part V addresses the potential conflict between the arbitrator's accountability
to the parties' expectations and the arbitrator's evolving role as adjudicator of
employees' public law claims. We conclude that the parties' expectations are
evolving, spurred on by the pervasive influence of the FMLA. We suggest
that the potential conflict between arbitral roles is likely to be ameliorated by
that evolution.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
THE PARTIES
Since the earliest days of the profession, labor arbitrators have been
grappling with the problem of how external law should be applied to the
resolution of grievances under collective bargaining agreements. 5 Arbitrators
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
3 The typical collective bargaining agreement contains a very short period for filing
a grievance. The FMLA statute of limitations is two years and is extended to three years
for willful violations. Id. § 2617(c).
4 We previously raised this issue in a brief essay. Jeanne M. Vonhof & Martin H.
Malin, What a Mess! The FALA, Collective Bargaining and Attendance Control Plans,
ILL. PuB. EMP. REL. REP., Fall 2004, at 1, 4-5.
5 In the first volume of published papers of the National Academy of Arbitrators,
Archibald Cox authored a paper entitled, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, in THE
PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION, SELECTED PAPER FROM THE FIRST SEVEN ANNUAL
MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 1948-1954, at 76-89. The
paper was written even before the Steelworkers' Trilogy was decided, and discussed a
conflict that arose frequently immediately after World War II between provisions of the
Selective Service Act and seniority provisions of labor agreements.
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see their primary role as interpreting and applying the collective bargaining
agreement between the parties. The agreement between the parties is their
"law." Thus, conflict may arise over whether and how to apply "external
laws" to problems that arise under the "law" of the collective bargaining
agreement. Questions over the FMLA are only the newest manifestation of
this recurring problem.
How do arbitrators resolve this issue? In making a decision regarding
any dispute put before the arbitrator, the arbitrator tries to determine and
meet the expectations of the parties and to preserve their bargain. While this
observation appears obvious, it has significant ramifications with regard to
the interplay between arbitration and external law.
The ethic that the parties and their expectations control the arbitration
process emerges in the earliest significant writings about labor arbitration. In
these writings the arbitrator is seen as an instrument of the parties' system of
workplace self-governance. In his groundbreaking article on labor
arbitration, Harry Shulman, the first Umpire for the Ford-UAW labor
agreement and Dean of Yale Law School, suggested that the underlying
premise of American collective bargaining is "that wages and other
conditions of employment be left to autonomous determination by employers
and labor." 6 He described and helped define the role of the arbitrator within
this autonomous system created by the parties:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a
community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their
pleasure only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective
bargaining agreement. They are entitled to demand that, at least on balance,
his performance be satisfactory to them, and they can readily dispense with
him if it is not.7
In the Steelworkers Trilogy,8 the Court explicitly included this quote
from Shulman's article and relied upon his idea of arbitration as part of the
parties' system of self-governance. In these landmark decisions, in which the
Court defined the legal framework of labor arbitration, the Court.described
6 Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV.
999, 1000 (1955).
7 Id. at 1016.
8 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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the collective bargaining agreement as "an effort to erect a system of
industrial self-government." 9 Furthermore, according to the Court, it is
because labor arbitration is an integral part of the collective bargaining
process that it is due significant deference by the courts. Labor arbitration,
the Court noted, is not simply an alternative method of dispute resolution, in
the way that commercial arbitration is a substitute for litigation. Instead, the
Court stated:
Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of
labor disputes has quite different functions fiom arbitration under an
ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward
arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of
collective disputes is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself.1l
The Court noted that federal law explicitly stated that the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising under a collective
bargaining agreement is "[fjinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties."11 According to the Court "[t]hat policy can be effectuated only if the
means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under the
collective bargaining agreement is given full play." 12
Arbitration functions as a substitute for industrial strife by providing the
parties with a peaceful vehicle to resolve their differences under their CBA.
At the time of the Trilogy, lawsuits were not a real possibility for unions in
most cases, because either there were not laws covering their disputes or the
courts did not adequately enforce their agreements. The economic pressure of
the strike might be applied even over routine discharges. However, the strike
is a blunt and costly tool for both parties as a method of enforcing the
agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court has recognized that in the
typical CBA, the arbitration procedure is the quid pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike during the contract's term.13 David Feller, whose
briefs as a lawyer successfully arguing the Trilogy cases were relied upon by
the Court and who later became a renowned arbitrator and labor law
professor, has theorized that the true essence of a CBA consists of the
grievance-arbitration procedure and the no strike clause. 14 Arbitration
9 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580.
10 Id. at 578.
11 Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 566 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)).
12 Id.
13 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
14 David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL.
L. REv. 663 (1973).
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continues to provide a way of resolving the many issues that arise in the
workplace without having to "go to the mat" on every issue. The ultimate,
risky, and very costly tool of the strike is preserved for the most important
issues.
Arbitration enables the parties to avoid workplace strife in a second way.
The availability of a grievance-arbitration procedure enables the parties to
reach agreement on the terms of the CBA even though they do not agree
precisely on what those terms mean. For example, a common CBA provision
requires the employer to post vacancies and sets forth a period of time during
which employees covered by the CBA may bid to fill the vacancies. The
provision further states that where the qualifications of two competing
bidders are relatively equal, the job shall go to the more senior of the two.
The negotiations leading to such a provision probably began with the union
demanding that vacancies be filled strictly by seniority and the employer
demanding that they be filled based on qualifications as judged by
management. The compromise probably did not resolve the parties'
differences over the interaction between qualifications and seniority. Each
party realized that its meaning of "relatively equal" differed greatly from the
other's. However, the availability of the grievance-arbitration procedure
allowed the parties to agree on the language knowing that they disagreed on
its meaning and postpone refinement of the meaning to case-by-case
negotiation through the grievance procedure with the understanding that if, in
any given case, they were unable to agree, the language would mean in that
case whatever the arbitrator would say it meant.
The availability of the grievance-arbitration procedure also enables the
parties to reach agreement on general terms of a CBA where further
refinement would be impracticable. Consider, for example, the typical CBA
provision requiring just cause for discipline and discharge. It would be
impracticable, perhaps even impossible, for the parties in negotiating the
contract, to draft a precise disciplinary code, specifying what acts of
misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance would be subject to what
penalties. Instead, they agree on a general just cause provision and defer
refinement of its meaning to case-by-case negotiation through the grievance
procedure with the understanding that if they are unable to agree on the
meaning in any particular case, they will be bound by the arbitrator's
interpretation.
Giving "full play" to the parties' own system of resolving their
differences led the Supreme Court in the Trilogy to conclude that courts
generally should not interfere with arbitration, either to decide that certain
matters are inarbitrable before arbitration begins or to review the merits of an
award after arbitration. With regard to the ability of the courts to determine
whether a subject is arbitrable, the Court held that courts should not deny an
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
order to arbitrate a particular grievance "unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage."15
The Court elaborated on how limited the role of the courts is even in
making this determination of arbitrability. A court is confined to
ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or
wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these
circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's
judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was
bargained for.
The courts, therefore, have no business ... considering whether there is
equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular
language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The
agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which
the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims
may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant
environment may be quite unaware. 16
Furthermore, the notion that arbitration is part of the parties' system of
workplace self-governance underlies the Court's decision to strictly limit
judicial review of labor arbitration awards. In Paperworkers v. Misco, 17 the
Court reiterated its holding from the Trilogy that as long as an award "draws
its essence fiom the collective bargaining agreement,"' 8
the courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even
though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on
misinterpretation of the contract. "The refusal of courts to review the merits
of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of
awards." 19
The Court's view that deference is due to arbitration awards is colored by
15 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
16 Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
17 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
18 Id. at 36 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
19 Id. (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596).
204
[Vol. 21:1 20051
EVOLVING ROLE
the view that arbitrators are "indispensable agencies in a continuous
collective bargaining process." 20 According to the Court, the collective
bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman [of the written collective
bargaining agreement] cannot wholly anticipate." 2 1 The arbitrator is called
upon to help resolve those disputes that the parties did not wholly
anticipate-or for other reasons have decided to resolve through arbitration.
Again, the Court contrasts the labor agreement with a commercial contract:
Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial contracts are
resorted to... [as] the unwanted exception. But the grievance machinery
under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of
industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the
unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will
generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. 22
Thus, according to the Court, "the labor arbitrator is usually chosen
because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of
the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment. '23 The parties have bargained for the arbitrator to "bring his
informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem." 24
This is especially true where "the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide
variety of situations," such as in formulating remedies.25 Thus, as David
Feller has written:
The collective bargaining agreement is not a contract insofar as it
establishes the rights of employers and employees, but is, rather, a set of
rules governing their relationship-rules which are integral with and cannot
be separated from the machinery that the parties have established to resolve
disputes as to their meaning. 26
20 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added).
21 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
2 2 Id. at 581.
23 Id.
24 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
25 Id.
26 David Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in ARBITRATION
1976, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
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Broad judicial deference to labor arbitrator rulings occurs in an
environment which has a high degree of self-policing. The union and
employer jointly select the arbitrator. Both the union and the employer are
likely repeat players in the arbitration system. Consequently, each balances
the other, ensuring that the arbitrator selected is not likely to be biased
toward either party. If either party perceives an arbitrator as favoring the
other party, it will strike that arbitrator from consideration for future
appointments. Consequently, labor arbitrators realize that any attempt to
curry favor with one party will short circuit their careers. 27 Experienced
arbitrators recognize that the only route to long term success, known in the
practice as "acceptability," is to decide cases on their merits, fairly,
impartially and professionally. For example, Arnold Zack, a highly respected
arbitrator, has advised, "[A]n arbitrator should decide every case as if it is his
last one .... If an arbitrator is concerned with the parties' reactions to his
rulings, he will not survive. An arbitrator must adhere to his own reasoning
and judgment and establish his reputation on that." 28
The broad authority of arbitrators as established by the Supreme Court is
not without limits. Under the Trilogy, it is not the law, however, but rather
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, who determine those
limits. Thus, according to the Court, the arbitrator, "does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement." '29
The self-policing nature of party selection of the arbitrator ensures that
the arbitrator will decide the case in accordance with the parties'
expectations. Arbitrators who fail to decide cases in accordance with the
mutual expectations of the parties are not likely to work again. Thus, it is the
expectations of the parties that is the primary constraint on labor
arbitrators. 30
Thus, the Supreme Court, in creating the legal framework for arbitration,
ARBITRATORS 97, 101 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976). Feller also
argued in this paper that it is the recognition that arbitration is "part of a system of
industrial self-governance" and not the special competence of arbitrators that prompts
deference from the courts.
27 See generally Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88
YALE L.J. 905 (1979).
28 Arnold Zack, Decision-Making, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK 113 (Christoper A. Barreca et al. eds., 1983).
29 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
30 See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1198-99 (1993).
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did so as a result of its view that arbitration is an integral part of the
autonomous system of self-government represented by the collective
bargaining process. The importance of the Trilogy and its reasoning cannot
be overstated. Had it not been for the deference toward arbitration
established by the Court at that crucial juncture, it is unlikely that labor
arbitration would have assumed the role that it enjoys today.
III. THE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN
THE 1960's AND AFTER AND THE MELTZER-HOWLETT DEBATE
The Supreme Court decided the Trilogy at a time when there were few
other laws directly affecting employees' rights. In a provocative paper, David
Feller referred to this era as "Arbitration's Golden Age," in which,
essentially, "the sole source of law in industries in which the grievance and
arbitration machinery was well-established was the collective agreement." 31
According to Feller, even the effect of the National Labor Relations Act
was primarily procedural, i.e. designed to protect the process by which the
parties' system of self-governance was created.32 Other laws that created
substantive rights, like the guarantee for overtime pay, were not that
important, he argued, because they set only minimum standards.33
This situation changed during the 1960's, when Congress enacted a
number of laws creating substantive rights for employees: the Equal Pay
Act, 34 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 35 the Occupational Safety
and Health Act,36 and ERISA.37 Feller argued that the passage of these laws
marked the end of the "Golden Age," because the introduction of public law
as a source of employee rights, and the availability of other bodies to enforce
them
necessarily undermine the unitary-or almost unitary-system of
governance under the agreement of which the institution of arbitration and
its special status are the products. Arbitration is not an independent
31 Feller, supra note 26, at 108.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
36 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).
37 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). To that list we can now add the employment
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), as
well as the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000). In addition, the
number of state laws affecting the employment relationship in these areas also has
increased since the 1960's.
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force ... and to the extent that the collective agreement is diminished as a
source of employee rights, arbitration is equally diminished.3
8
One need not accept Feller's position about the ultimate effect of these
laws on arbitration to agree that because of these laws, external law is
potentially implicated in many more grievances than during "the Golden
Age." Their increasing contact with external law led to a recurring debate
among labor arbitrators about how to handle these problems.
The debate is often referred to as the "Meltzer-Howlett debate," after a
famous exchange between Professor Bernard Meltzer and arbitrator Robert
Howlett at the twentieth annual meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. Meltzer acknowledged that where an arbitrator faces two
interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement, one of which is
repugnant to a statute, "the statue is a relevant factor for interpretation." 39
However, he continued, "Where... there is an irrepressible conflict, the
arbitrator, in my opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law." 40
Meltzer reasoned that arbitrators could not be credited "with any
competence, let alone any special expertise, with respect to the law, as
distinguished from the agreement." 4 1 Arbitrators deciding cases on the law
instead of the contract, in Meltzer's view, "would be deciding issues that go
beyond not only the submission agreement but also arbitral competence.
Arbitrators would, moreover, be doing so within a procedural framework
different from that applicable to official tribunals. Finally, they would be
impinging on an area in which courts or other official tribunals are granted
plenary authority. '42
In a subsequent article, Meltzer explained that his contention that
arbitrators lack competence to resolve statutory claims referred to arbitrators'
institutional competence rather than individual arbitrators' personal
abilities.4 3 The problem of institutional competence arose from the
underlying purpose of arbitration. It is a vehicle for resolving disputes under
the CBA and the arbitrator's presumed expertise and the parties' consent to
be bound by the arbitrator's judgment were limited to the CBA. In addition,
38 Feller, supra note 26, at 109.
39 Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, in
THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 15 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967)
[hereinafter NAA 20TH MTG PROC.] (reprinted at 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 545 (1967)).
40 Id. at 16.
4 Id.
42 Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
43 Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting
RemediesJbr Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 30, 34 (1971).
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many arbitrators lacked legal training. 44
Howlett, on the other hand, argued that "arbitrators should render
decisions on the issues before them based on both contract language and
law. ' 45 He maintained that the law is incorporated into every agreement, 46
and that "[t]he law is part of the 'essence [of the] collective bargaining
agreement' to which Mr. Justice Douglas has referred. 47
Howlett also considered arbitrators obligated to probe for statutory
issues, even those that the parties have not raised. In Howlett's view, when
an arbitrator's probing uncovers issues that are better resolved by external
legal authority, the arbitrator should so advise the parties and withdraw from
the case.48
Meltzer and Howlett represent the two poles of the debate over when and
how to apply external law, especially when there is a clear conflict between
the law and the contract. Arbitrator Richard Mittenthal took a position
between Meltzer's and Howlett's, the year after their debate, arguing that
"although the arbitrator's award may permit conduct forbidden by law but
sanctioned by contract, it should not require conduct forbidden by law even
though sanctioned by contract."49
The Supreme Court appeared to endorse Meltzer's position in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co.50 Gardner-Denver discharged Alexander, who
grieved and lost in arbitration. Alexander also sued under Title VII. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Alexander's unsuccessful
grievance arbitration precluded his Title VII litigation. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the grievance arbitration and the Title VII litigation
were independent of each other. The Court relied on Meltzer's writings
concerning the arbitrator's lack of institutional competence to resolve public
law claims. 51 However, in a subsequent decision, the Court suggested that an
arbitrator has authority under the contract doctrine of impossibility of
44 Id.
45 Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator the NLRB and the Courts, in NAA 20TH MTG
PROC., supra note 39, at 67, 83 (emphasis in original).
46 Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 83. Howlett did express one caveat to his position. Where the parties advise
the arbitrator that they are reserving statutory questions for presentation to an external
forum, the arbitrator should avoid the statutory issues or withdraw from the case. Id at
87.
48 Id. at 92-93.
49 Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21 ST ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42, 50 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1968).
50 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
51 Id. at 52-53 & n.16.
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performance to refuse to enforce a CBA provision that conflicts with external
law.52
The debate continues, as arbitrators have continued to refine their
thinking about whether and how to apply an increasing list of laws in the
great variety of situations in which they arise. Where the contract language
specifically incorporates a law, or the parties explicitly agree to the arbitrator
interpreting the law as part of the grievance, few arbitrators would reject this
assignment or conclude that they do not have the authority to do so. That
authority comes from the parties themselves. Nor would most arbitrators
proceed to interpret and apply a law when the labor agreement-or the
parties at the arbitration hearing-specifically prohibit such action. In both of
these cases the arbitrator has a clear path to follow to meet the expectations
of the parties. The vexing cases, of course, are those in which the parties'
expectations are not so clear. What should the arbitrator do if one party
argues that the law applies and the other does not agree? What if, as is often
the case now with the FMLA, the language of the written agreement
incorporates some of the language of the statute? Should an arbitrator apply
only those sections from the statute that are referenced in the agreement?
Should the arbitrator apply the general principles underlying a law, such as
Title VII or the ADA, without applying all the precise requirements for a
finding of discrimination developed by the courts? What should the arbitrator
do if he or she believes that an application of the law may result in a different
disposition of the case than if it is not considered, and neither side raises the
issue? 53
Theodore St. Antoine, another past president of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, has described the role of the arbitrator as that of the "contract
reader." He uses this phrase to express the view that the parties in arbitration
have bargained for the interpretation of their contract provided by the
arbitrator-including the arbitrator's interpretation of external law-and the
courts should not disturb that interpretation.54 According to St. Antoine, "the
52 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 767 n.10 (1983).
53 For a critique of the arbitration system as it has developed, see James A. Gross,
Incorporating Human Rights Principals into US. Labor Arbitration: A Proposal for
Fundamental Change, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2004). The author criticizes those
who lament the passing of an age when external laws protecting employees' rights did
not affect arbitration significantly. He argues that arbitrators should go even beyond the
law and rely upon fundamental human rights principles in deciding workplace disputes.
He applies this analysis to a study of arbitration cases involving employees who have
refused to work for safety reasons.
54 Theodore St. Antoine, Presidential Address, Contract Reading Revisited, in
ARBITRATION 2000, WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
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arbitrator's award should be treated as though it were a written stipulation by
the parties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor
contract. '55 Thus, under St. Antoine's view, the arbitrator's interpretation-
even of external law-becomes part of their contract. It is especially
important then for the arbitrator to try to determine the parties' expectations
with regard to that external law when the contract language itself is not clear.
How does the arbitrator discern the parties' expectations with regard to
external law when the contract itself is not clear about it? In a 1989 address
to the National Academy of Arbitrators, Richard Mittenthal and Richard
Bloch discussed the role of the "implications" of an agreement, principles
that the arbitrator may infer when the contract itself is silent:
Implications arise from existing but unstated realities of the world in which
the contracting parties live and the circumstances that surround the making
of their bargain. These realities, these "facts of life," have little or nothing to
do with what is actually said at the bargaining table. It is this world of
implications that puts arbitrators to the sternest test. 56
The test is stem because the arbitrator may not simply impose his own
brand of industrial justice. The purpose for giving credit to such implications
is to meet the arbitrator's "overriding concern.. . to preserve the parties'
bargain, not to change it."' 57 The authors suggested situations in which
arbitrators commonly infer such implications that are not found in the
collective bargaining agreement, e.g. in the "work now, grieve later"
doctrine; the principle that an employer does not have an unlimited right to
contract out work, even in the absence of any contract language over
subcontracting; and in the position that interest should not be awarded on
backpay awards.
In a nod to St. Antoine's use of the term "contract reader," the authors
suggested that when the arbitrator considers these implications, he or she
becomes "the bargain reader. '58 As a general rule, the authors concluded that
ARBITRATORS 1, 1-2 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig eds., 2001) [hereinafter NAA 53RD
PROC.].
55 Theodore St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1977).
56 Richard Mittenthal & Richard Bloch, Arbitral Implications: Hearing the Sounds
of Silence, in ARBITRATION 1989, THE ARBITRATOR'S DISCRETION DURING AND AFTER
THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 65, 66 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1990) [hereinafter NAA
42ND PROC.].
57 Id. at 67 (emphasis in original).
58 Id. at 81-82.
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arbitrators should "reject external law implications" because "[b]y doing so
they preserve the parties' bargain:" 59
The prevailing view, particularly in the private sector, is that laws are not
part of the contract and that arbitration is not a forum for enforcing statutory
rights .... The implication that applicable law is incorporated in the
contract would be warranted where there is a real or tacit understanding to
that effect .... It is doubtful that there is any general understanding among
employers and unions on this matter. Negotiators are concerned with wages,
hours, working conditions, and fringe benefits. They seldom traffic in such
abstract notions as the role of law under the contract.60
Richard Bloch returned to this issue eleven years later in his 2000
address to the National Academy on just cause. 61 He noted that "[t]imes are
changing" and that "[a]rbitrators will, in fact, have to deal with prospects of
incorporated statutory references, because they are surely relevant" and that
"[c]ontracts should not be interpreted in a manner that is clearly contrary to a
statutory mandate." 62 But he emphasized that "this whole exercise remains
private," 63 and that the just cause clause of the agreement still predominates
in discipline cases. In his view, application of an external law is just one
aspect in the consideration of just cause. Bloch contended that when the
parties "incorporate [a law] by reference" the arbitrator should not "infer that
the parties sat down and decided to swallow, wholesale, each section and
each implementing regulation." According to the author, "absent clear
guidance from the parties, the assumption by the arbitrator must be that these
statutes have been incorporated, if at all, for the purpose of absorbing their
generalized benevolent goals, and not necessarily for their specifics in every
detail." 64
The question posed by this article is whether this view of external law
and arbitration is changing. What are the parties' expectations? What is the
bargain that the arbitrator should preserve with regard to the application of
external law in 2005, particularly with regard to the FMLA? Should the
arbitrator assume that the parties intended to incorporate, if at all, only the
general purpose of the FMLA or its specifics as well? Do the parties expect
the arbitrator to render an award in which the result complies with the
59 Id. at 78.
60 Id. at 67.
61 Richard I. Bloch, The Changing Face of Just Cause: One Standard or Many?, in
NAA 53RD PROC., supra note 54, at 20.
6 2 Id. at 33.
63 Id.
64Id. at 37.
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FMLA? Do they expect the arbitrator to know and apply not just the law but
the implementing regulations to the FMLA? Is the arbitration process to
remain essentially private if it becomes even more entwined with external
law? We survey developments that significantly impact these questions in the
next Part.
IV. THRUSTING PUBLIC LAW ONTO LABOR ARBITRATORS: HAS THE
MELTZER-HOWLETT DEBATE BEEN RENDERED MOOT?
Many developments since the original debate between Professor Meltzer
and Arbitrator Howlett and since the Court's decision in Gardner-Denver
seemingly have overtaken the debate. One of these developments is
internal-parties have expressly incorporated the public law into their
contracts. It is very common for parties to include a non-discrimination
clause in their CBAs and it is common for such non-discrimination clauses to
expressly refer to public law.65 It is increasingly common for parties to
expressly refer to the FMLA in the CBA.66 In the public sector, parties often
expressly incorporate relevant statutes and regulations into the CBAs.
Most of the developments overtaking the Meltzer-Howlett debate are
external, however. In the public sector, these include the requirement that
arbitrators of disputes involving agencies of the federal government apply the
law with exactitude. Some state courts are developing expansive views of the
scope of public policy review of arbitration awards. The most far-reaching
developments are those that follow in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.67 Not surprisingly,
courts are taking a much broader view of a labor arbitrator's authority to
interpret and apply public law. We explore each of these developments
below.
A. Developments in the Federal Sector
The basic function of the grievance and arbitration process in the private
sector is to assure compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.
Arbitration between unions and agencies of the federal government also
serves this purpose. A "second and also very important function" of the
process in the federal sector is to "review and police compliance by federal
agency employers and employees alike with controlling laws, rules and
65 See ELKoURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 516.
66 See Vonhof & Malin, supra note 4, at 3.
67 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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regulations." 68 The Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute
(FSLMS) requires every collective bargaining agreement in the federal sector
to include a grievance procedure. In addition, the law requires that collective
bargaining agreements provide for binding arbitration for any grievances not
resolved under the negotiated grievance procedure. The law also provides
broad definitions for "grievances" and for what grievances "shall" be subject
to the grievance and arbitration procedures. 69
While many subjects are thus required by law to be arbitrated in the
federal sector, the FSLMS also places substantial limits on the process.
Collective bargaining is prohibited--or in some cases only permitted-on
certain matters that would be mandatory subjects of bargaining in the private
sector. Bargaining is prohibited on certain subjects that are considered by law
to be within the exclusive decision-making authority of management. 70
68 ELKOURi & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 1282.
69 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (2000).
70 Thus 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) states that the authority granted federal employees to
engage in collective bargaining over the conditions of employment shall not affect the
authority of any management official of any agency:
(1) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal
security practices of the agency; and
(2) in accordance with applicable laws-
(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency, or to
suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action
against such employees;
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out,
and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be
conducted;
(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments
from-
(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
(ii) any other appropriate source; and
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission
during emergencies.
The words "in accordance with applicable laws" have been successfully employed to
challenge certain management actions. EEOC v. FLRA, 744 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(holding that in making "contracting-out" decision, agency did not follow circular issued
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)). The clause appears to be properly
enforceable through the grievance and arbitration processes. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 1, at 1286. In addition, management may be required to engage in "implementation
bargaining," i.e. bargaining over procedures to be observed by management in exercising
its rights and "impact bargaining," i.e. bargaining over the effect on employees of
exercising management rights. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2)-(3) (2000). Furthermore, while
deference is given in the law to "[g]ovemment-wide rule[s] or regulation[s]," over which
bargaining is not required, the same deference does not apply to "lower level" rules and
regulations. Generally a collective bargaining agreement will control over a lower level
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Arbitration awards and decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) recognize that certain federal sector management rights cannot be
bargained away. Negotiated contract language that is inconsistent with the
rights reserved to management by law is not enforceable. 71
Therefore, a grievance may not be sustained in the federal sector if the
grievance is based upon a contract provision addressing a subject that the
statute excludes from bargaining, or a provision that infringes on a right
reserved to management by law. In addition, a grievance may not be
sustained if it infringes on other federal laws, rules, or regulations.
Most arbitration awards in the federal sector are reviewable by the
FLRA, upon the timely request of either party. Those that are not reviewable
by the FLRA may be reviewable by the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or the
federal courts. 72 By law, the FLRA may conclude that an arbitration award is
"deficient" on grounds "similar to those applied by Federal courts in private
sector labor-management relations. ' 73 However, in addition to the regular
private-sector grounds for review, the FSLMS specifically gives the FLRA
the authority to find an arbitration award deficient because it is "contrary to
any law, rule, or regulation." 74 The law also gives the FLRA the authority to
"take such action and make such recommendations concerning the award as
it considers necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules, or
regulation. However, conflict arises over "intermediate level" regulations, those issued,
for example, by the top level or head of an agency or a primary national subdivision of
the agency. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 1292-95. Even government-wide
regulations may not apply if the collective bargaining agreement precedes the
government regulation. 5 U.S.C. §7116(a)(7).
71 See, e.g., Veterans Adm. Med. Ctr. & Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 2028,
25 F.L.R.A. 520 (1987); 438 Air Base Group & Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 1778,
22 F.L.R.A. 12 (1986); Defense Contract Adm. & Nat'l Ass'n Gov't Employees Local
R2-65, 20 F.L.R.A. 783 (1985); Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 1712 & U.S. Army,
172nd Infantry Brigade, 6 F.L.R.A. 466 (1981).
72 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 1295. For a useful chart of which kinds of
disputes may be taken to which forum, and reviewed by which forum, see id. at 1280.
73 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(2). Employing these standards, the FLRA has concluded that
an arbitration award is "deficient" because the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority,
the award does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, the award
is based on a gross error of fact or a "nonfact," the hearing was not conducted fairly, the
award is contrary to public policy, the award is incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory,
making its implementation impossible, the arbitrator was biased or partial, or the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. See cases cited in ELKOURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
74 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(1).
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regulations. '75 The FLRA has exercised this authority to overturn or modify
arbitration awards.
Furthermore, the FLRA exercises substantial authority in determining
whether an arbitration award is deficient because it violates the law. The
FLRA conducts a de novo review of whether an arbitration award violates a
law, examining whether the arbitrator's legal conclusions are consistent with
the applicable standard of law. Generally, the FLRA defers to the arbitrator
with regard to factual findings.
There appears to be no hard data on what percentage of federal
arbitration awards are submitted to the FLRA or to other bodies for review.
There is, however, a strong perception that arbitration awards in the federal
sector are reviewed and overturned more frequently than in other sectors.7 6
In part, no doubt this is because of the explicit statutory right provided to the
parties in the federal sector to file exceptions to arbitration awards. A higher
rate of review probably also results, however, from -the inextricable
intertwining of law with the arbitration process in the federal sector-and
particularly with the authority given to the FLRA to find as "deficient" an
arbitration award that conflicts with "any law, rule or regulation."
Furthermore, given the primary role of law in federal sector arbitration,
various commentators have called for arbitrators to refrain from rendering
awards that conflict with laws, rules, or regulations. The FLRA has the
authority to overturn or modify such awards without any regard to whether
the parties have raised and discussed these items in arbitration. The chair of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority has told arbitrators that they need to
"look beyond the contract. They need to apply the proper laws. It's in their
interest and in the interest of the parties. '77 She has also told arbitrators that
they have the responsibility to ensure that their awards comply with federal
statutes and regulations and has suggested that arbitrators may have to do
75 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a).
76 See James Harkless, FLRA Review of Arbitration Awards, in NAA 42ND PROC.,
supra note 56, at 229, 229-30. While former Academy President Harkless concluded that
the parties filed exceptions over only a small portion of arbitration awards in the federal
sector, he found that the FLRA modified or set aside about 18% of the arbitration awards
on exceptions filed between January 1979 and January 1988. He found particularly
disturbing that the FLRA sustained less than 50 percent of the arbitration awards
involving agency-filed exceptions.
77 Jean McKee, Federal Sector Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1991, THE CHANGING
FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 44TH ANNUAL
MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 187, 190 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed.,
1992).
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research independent of the parties.78 Arbitrators who work in the federal
sector also have urged other arbitrators to become more familiar with
applicable legal precedents in the federal sector. Former President of the
National Academy of Arbitrators, James Harkless, urged Academy members
in 1989 to "be sure in each case that any applicable statutes, rules, or
regulations are carefully considered" in order to reduce the rate of FLRA
reversals or modifications of arbitration awards, and to avoid "call[ing] into
question the competence of arbitrators to resolve successfully labor-
management disputes in which some law, rule, or regulation may have an
effect."'79 While the sheer volume of laws, rules, or regulations applicable to
a federal sector arbitration might appear overwhelming, one federal agency
commentator suggested (in 1989 at least) that federal sector arbitrators need
to pay attention to four primary laws or regulations: 1) non-waivable
management rights as contained in 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a); 2) harmful-errors
standard for review of disciplinary actions in 5 U.S.C. § 7701; 3) the Back
Pay Act; and 4) the rules regarding attorneys' fees.80
Thus, arbitrators hearing cases between federal agencies and the unions
that represent their employees are expected to apply public law and are
expected to ensure that their awards do not contravene public law. In
essence, the Meltzer-Howlett debate simply does not apply in the federal
sector.
B. The State and Local Government Public Sector
State law governs labor relations and collective bargaining among state
and local government employees, and the approaches vary widely from state
to state. 81 The approach to labor arbitration also varies considerably among
78 See Jean McKee, The Arbitration of Statutory Disputes: The Authority
Perspective, in ARBITRATION 1992, IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY SKILLS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 143 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1993).
79 Harkless, supra note 76, at 235. He also suggested that many awards were
overturned simply because arbitrators did not make proper findings necessary to comply
with the federal Back Pay Act. He identified the findings that the arbitrator must make as
follows: 1) that an agency action was unjustified or unwarranted; 2) that this resulted in
the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the grievant's pay or allowances, and that
"but for" the agency's unwarranted actions, the grievant otherwise would not have
suffered such withdrawal or reduction in pay.
80 William R. Kansier, Arbitration in the Federal Sector, A Panel Discussion, in
NAA 42ND PRoc., supra note 56, at 206.
81 See generally JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 81-91 (2004).
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the states.82 Developments in some of the states have thrust arbitrators into
interpreting and applying the public law.
In American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v.
Department of Central Management Services,83 the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services discharged a caseworker who had reported that
three minor children assigned to her were doing fine when, in fact, the
children had died in a fire a month earlier. The union grieved the discharge
and an arbitrator ruled that the discharge violated the collective bargaining
agreement's requirement that discipline be imposed in a timely manner. The
arbitrator ordered that the caseworker be reinstated and made whole for her
losses.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the arbitration award was
unenforceable because it contravened public policy. In so holding, the court
faulted the arbitrator for failing to consider the public policy ramifications of
the remedy that he awarded:
The arbitrator's remedy for the violation of the contract's time provision
caused him to fully reinstate a DCFS child welfare specialist-charged with
both falsifying a uniform progress report intended for submission to the
Juvenile Court and neglecting to compile required family service plans for
three years-without any determination that the welfare of the minors in the
DCFS system will not be compromised by such a reinstatement. Rather, he
avoided discussion of the charges against DuBose. He did not take any
precautionary steps to ensure the misconduct at issue here will not be
repeated, and he neither considered nor respected the pertinent public policy
concerns that arose from them. Thus, the remedy in this case violates public
policy in that it totally ignores any legitimate public policy concerns. 84
The court's admonition to arbitrators to consider the public policy
aspects of grievances coming before them has not been lost on the parties or
the arbitrators. Although a court in Illinois will enforce an arbitration award
that implicitly made findings that a remedy was consistent with public
policy,8 5 it has become common practice for arbitrators to make specific
public policy findings, particularly when sustaining grievances of employees
charged with serious misconduct. 86
82 See id. at 371-404.
83 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Dep't of Cent. Mgmt. Serv.,
671 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. 1996).
84 Id. at 678.
85 See State v. AFSCME Council 31, 749 N.E.2d 472, 476-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
86 See Edwin H. Benn & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Public Policy Exception in Illinois,
THE CHRONICLE, Fall 2005, at 23 (reporting on the comments of Arbitrator Edwin Bern
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In Knipp v. Lawrence County Board of Commissioners,87 the director of
the Lawrence County Department of Job and Family Services informed
Knipp, a social worker employed by the department, that her employment
was terminated. The director did not obtain approval of the termination from
the county Board of Commissioners. Knipp sued, alleging that the
department failed to follow procedures mandated by Ohio statute for
terminating an employee. The Ohio Court of Appeals held, however, that
Knipp was required to grieve and arbitrate her claim that her purported
termination contravened state statute. The arbitrator hearing such grievance
would be thrust into the role of interpreting and applying public law rather
than the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Developments in the public sector might be dismissed as quirks of
individual states. However, as developed in the next section, these
developments are consistent with a developing pattern in the private sector
that is causing arbitrators to increasingly resolve employees' public law
claims in the course of collectively bargained grievance-arbitration.
C. The Fallout from Gilmer
As union density declined, employment litigation and the cost thereof
increased. A number of employers, particularly in the securities industry,
began requiring employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to
arbitrate any claim arising out of their employment, including claims based
on federal statutes. All circuits that considered the issue except for the Fourth
Circuit relied on Gardner-Denver and its progeny to hold such pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims unenforceable. 88 In
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,89 the Supreme Court sided with the
outlier Fourth Circuit and held that an agreement contained in a securities
at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting, May 27, 2005).
87 Knipp v. Lawrence County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2005-Ohio-3103 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005); see also Kostecki v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 837 (I11. App. Ct.
2005) (requiring employee to arbitrate under CBA claims for violations of state wage
payment and overtime statutes).
88 See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated
by 500 U.S. 930 (1991); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989);
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters
Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d
1544 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.
1986). The sole authority holding a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a statutory
employment claim enforceable was the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gilmer. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
89 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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exchange's registration obligating the employee to arbitrate all claims against
his employer was enforceable with respect to the employee's claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Gilmer did not expressly overrule Gardner-Denver. Gilmer distinguished
Gardner-Denver as a case arising under a collective bargaining agreement
where the arbitrator's authority was limited to interpreting and applying the
CBA and did not extend to resolving statutory claims. 90 A major tenet of
Gardner-Denver's reasoning, however, was the Court's view that the arbitral
forum was poorly suited for resolving statutory claims. This aspect of the
Court's reasoning expressly relied on Meltzer's writings concerning the
arbitrator's lack of institutional competence to adjudicate statutory claims.
The Gilmer Court flatly rejected that portion of the rationale:
The Court in... Gardner-Denver Co. also expressed the view that
arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving statutory claims.
That "mistrust of the arbitral process," however, has been undermined by
our recent arbitration decisions. "[W]e are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution." 91
Not surprisingly, encouraged by the affirmance in Gilmer, the Fourth
Circuit continued its pattern in arbitration cases and held that employees
covered by CBAs were required to pursue their statutory claims through the
CBA's grievance and arbitration procedure. 92 The Fourth Circuit was again
an outlier, as all other circuits that addressed the issue held that Gardner-
Denver continued to control.93 In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp. ,94 the Court declined to resolve the issue of whether an employee can
be compelled to arbitrate a statutory claim under the provisions of a CBA.
The Court held, however, that if such an agreement waiving the judicial
90 Id. at 34.
91 Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).
92 See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996).
93 See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-65 (7th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,
112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117
F.3d 519, 525-26 (11 th Cir. 1997); Vamer v. Nat'l Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213
(8th Cir. 1996); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1995).
94 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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forum is to be enforced, the agreement must be clear and unmistakable. 95 In
so doing, the Court recognized the tension between Gilmer and Gardner-
Denver,96 but declined to resolve it definitively.
The Wright Court made clear that where a public law claim is arbitrated
under a CBA, "the ultimate question for the arbitrator would be not what the
parties have agreed to, but what federal law requires." 97 Thus, to the extent
that Wright or other fallout from Gilmer compels arbitration under a CBA of
a public law claim, arbitrators have an obligation to apply the relevant public
law. Arbitrators may also be thrust into applying public law where parties
choose to arbitrate public law claims because the fallout from Gilmer may
mean that the arbitration proceeding will be the only forum in which those
claims will be adjudicated.
1. Compelling Arbitration of Public Law Claims Under a CBA.
Gardner-Denver offered three reasons for its holding that an employee
may pursue a Title VII claim in court despite losing a grievance arbitration
arising out of the same set of facts: 1) Arbitration is inferior to adjudication
for resolving public law claims; 2) Grievance arbitration is intended to
resolve claims of breach of the CBA rather than claims arising under public
law independent of the CBA; and 3) The union, rather than the individual
employee, controls the grievance arbitration process.98
The first rationale has been completely undermined by Gilmer. The
second rationale led the Wright Court to require a clear and unmistakable
waiver of the judicial forum before compelling arbitration of a statutory
claim pursuant to a CBA. Whether the third concern should preclude waiver
of the judicial forum in a CBA was the issue left open in Wright.
Most courts considering defense requests to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate
their statutory claims under their CBA have applied Wright and found no
clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to litigate. 99 A significant
minority, however, have found the requisite waivers.
Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit has led the way. In Safrit v. Cone
95 Id. at 80.
9 6 Id. at 75.
9 7 Id. at 79.
98 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52, 56-58 & n.19 (1974).
99 See, e.g., Fayer v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2001); EEOC
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2001); Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d
73, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2000); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir.
2000); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1999); Quint v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1,9 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Mills Corp.,'00 the collective bargaining agreement's non-discrimination
provision recited that the parties agreed "to abide by all the requirements of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."101 The same provision declared,
"Unresolved grievances arising under this Section are the proper subjects for
arbitration.'' 10 2 Under the CBA, the employee could not proceed at any stage
of the grievance procedure without the union.10 3
After twelve years of employment with Cone Mills, Sarfit became a fixer
trainee and was the only female trainee in her class. She alleged that her
employer failed to train her properly and denied her job opportunities that
were available to other trainees. The union grieved and at the fourth step of
the grievance procedure the employer agreed to correct the deficiencies. The
plaintiff alleged, however, that the employer breached the agreement and
continued to discriminate against her. The union declined to file a new
grievance and advised the plaintiff to seek redress outside of the CBA.
Hence, plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC and ultimately filed suit. 04
The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff,
holding that the CBA waived her right to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The court reasoned, "[I]t is hard to imagine a waiver that would be more
definite or absolute. The parties agreed that they would 'abide by all the
requirements of Title VII' and that '[u]nresolved grievance arising under this
Section are the proper subjects for arbitration. ' "10 5
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that her good faith compliance
with the grievance procedure coupled with her inability to control processing
of the grievance should have relieved her of any duty to arbitrate. 10 6
Consequently, the plaintiff found herself out of court and also out of the
grievance and arbitration machinery. 107
Other courts have found clear and unmistakable waivers and compelled
arbitration of employee public law claims. Although many of these are
100 Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001).
101 Id. at 307.
102 Id.103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 308.
106 Id.
107 The harshness of the court's decision is apparent when it is compared to the
approach of the National Labor Relations Boad (NLRB). The NLRB often defers unfair
labor practice complaints to arbitration where the incident giving rise to the alleged unfair
labor practice may also give rise to a grievance. However, the NLRB conditions such
deferral on the employer's agreement to waive any procedural defects that might
otherwise preclude arbitration. See Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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within the Fourth Circuit, 10 8 the phenomenon is not limited to that
arbitration-happy jurisdiction. For example, the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court has compelled arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims where the collective bargaining agreements' grievance
and arbitration provisions expressly covered claims arising under the
statutes. 
109
Courts are also compelling arbitration under CBAs in cases where the
second or third Gardner-Denver concerns do not exist. For example, in Ruiz
v. Sysco Food Services,110 Sysco fired Ruiz for allegedly threatening his
supervisor with a knife. Ruiz grieved and an arbitrator found that the
investigation leading to Ruiz's discharge did not comply with CBA
requirements."' Following his reinstatement, Ruiz sued for, inter alia,
defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, all
arising out of the investigation and its aftermath. The California Court of
Appeal held that Ruiz was required to arbitrate his tort claims under the
CBA. The court reasoned that determining whether Ruiz could establish
"actual malice," required for the defamation claim, and "conduct beyond that
which a civilized society would tolerate," required for the emotional distress
claims, required interpretation of the CBA.1 12 It further opined that "[t]he
CBA language is broad enough to cover the subject matter of [Ruiz's]
complaint."1 13 Thus, an arbitrator hearing Ruiz's tort claims would have to
interpret the CBA and then interpret and apply California tort law to
determine whether Ruiz had a claim and what relief was appropriate. 114
108 See Wikle v. CNA Holdings, Inc., 9 F. App'x 112, 113-14 (4th Cir. 2001);
Singletary v. Enersys, Inc., 57 F. App'x. 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2003); Pine Ridge Coal Co. v.
Loffis, 271 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D.W.V. 2003); Saunders v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
265 F. Supp. 2d 624, 628 (E.D. Va. 2003).
109 See Garcia v. Bellmare Prop. Mgmt., 745 N.Y.S.2d 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002);
Torres v. Four Seasons Hotel, 715 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
110 Ruiz v. Sysco Food Servs., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
111 Id. at 703.
112 Id. at 707.
113 Id
114 The result in Ruiz contrasts with Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 288 F.3d 313
(7th Cir. 2002). Tice and fellow plaintiffs were pilots who, by Federal Aviation
Administration regulation, were disqualified from captain and first officer positions upon
attaining age sixty. They sought to down bid into flight officer positions and were denied.
They sued alleging that American's refusal to allow them to down bid was due to their
age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. American claimed that
under the CBA, no one disqualified from a captain or first officer position was allowed to
down bid regardless of whether the disqualification was the result of reaching age sixty or
some other nonage-related reason. The plaintiffs disputed that position. The court held
that the plaintiffs' claims depended on interpretation of the CBA and required the district
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Courts are also compelling arbitration of public law claims in cases
where the union's control over the arbitration proceeding is not at issue. For
example, in Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 550,115 Interstate
Brands sued the union under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act for damages resulting from an alleged secondary boycott. The CBA's
grievance procedure provided for the parties to arbitrate "all complaints,
disputes or grievances arising between them involving questions of
interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by this
Agreement, or any act or conduct or relation between the parties hereto,
directly or indirectly." 16
Relying on Wright, Interstate argued that the strong presumption of
arbitrability should not apply because it was pursuing a claim under a federal
statute. Interstate maintained that any waiver of its right to bring its claim in
federal court had to be clear and unmistakable." 17
The Second Circuit rejected the argument. According to the court,
Wright's requirement of a clear and unmistakable waiver resulted from
concerns with the union waiving the individual-employee's right to sue. The
court reasoned that the Wright requirement did not apply to an employer's
agreement in a CBA to arbitrate its statutory claims. Accordingly, the court
held that Interstate was required to arbitrate its section 303 claim against the
union. 118
In Barnica v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District,119 an equally
divided Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decision requiring an
employee to arbitrate his state statutory sex discrimination claim pursuant to
the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedure. The contract contained a
non-discrimination clause, 120 and a clause defining a grievance as "a claim
by a grievant that there has been an alleged violation.., of the
Agreement."' 121 The court's dispositional opinion distinguished Wright,
noting, inter alia, that grievance arbitration in public employment CBAs was
court to stay the lawsuit while plaintiffs pursued their claims under the CBA in
arbitration. The court indicated, however, that if plaintiffs obtained a favorable CBA
interpretation from the arbitrator, they could return to court to pursue their ADEA cause
of action.
115 Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 550, 167 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1999).
116 Id. at 765.
117 Id. at 767.
118 Id. at 767-68.
119 Barnica v. Kenia Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 46 P.3d 974 (Alaska 2002).
120 Id. at 976 n.9.
121Id. at 977 n.11.
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mandated by Alaska statute, 122 and that under Alaska state law, the union has
less control over the proceeding because the employee has a right to proceed
to arbitration on demand. 123
Thus, although most reported decisions refuse to compel arbitration of
public law claims under a CBA, courts are ordering such arbitration in a
significant minority of cases. Moreover, with increasing frequency, parties
are arbitrating public law claims and arbitrators are looking to public law in
adjudicating grievances without court compulsion. In such cases, after the
arbitrator renders an award, an employee may seek to litigate the public law
claim. Such action inevitably raises the question of the effect of the
arbitration award on the subsequent litigation.
2. Litigating a Public Law Claim Following an Arbitration Award
In Gardner-Denver, the Court recognized that an arbitration award
would be evidence in subsequent litigation with its weight to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 124 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit has held it to be
reversible error for a court to exclude the arbitration award from evidence.125
In a pre-Wright decision refusing to compel an employee to arbitrate
statutory claims under a CBA, the Seventh Circuit suggested that if the
claims were arbitrated, the employee would be collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issues resolved in the award. 126 Most courts since Wright
have not followed this approach. Nevertheless, where an adverse
employment action has been upheld in a grievance arbitration, the
evidentiary weight accorded the arbitration award often effectively precludes
the employee's public law claim.
In Collins v. New York City Transit Authority,12 7 the plaintiff was fired
after he allegedly assaulted his supervisor. He grieved and a tri-partite
arbitration board upheld his termination. Plaintiff sued alleging that his
discharge was the result of his race and his prior EEOC complaints, in
violation of Title VII. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
122 Id. at 977.
123 Id. at 980 n.48. By 3-2 vote, the Alaska Supreme Court has backed away from
Barnica. See Hammond v. State, 107 P.3d 871, 876 (Alaska 2005). However, the notion
that a standard more deferential to arbitration should apply when the employee has
greater control over the process than in the typical CBA has not been lost on other courts.
See, e.g., Serafin v. Connecticut, 10 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1120, 1124 (D. Conn.
Mar. 9, 2005).
124 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 & n.21 (1974).
125 Graefv. Chem. Leaman Corp., 106 F.3d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1997).
126 Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1997).
127 Collins v. New York City Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002).
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summary judgment and the Second Circuit affirmed. The court placed
particular weight on the arbitration award upholding the plaintiff's discharge.
The court opined:
[A] decision by an independent tribunal that is not itself subject to a claim
of bias will attenuate a plaintiff's proof of the requisite causal link [between
the adverse employment action and the allegedly illegal motive]. Where, as
here, that decision follows an evidentiary hearing and is based on
substantial evidence, the Title VII plaintiff, to survive a motion for
summary judgment, must present strong evidence that the decision was
wrong as a matter of fact--e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal-or
that the impartiality of the proceeding was compromised. 128
In Clarke v. UFI, Inc.,129 the court found that the arbitration award was
not entitled to res judicata effect. Nevertheless, the court opined that where
an arbitration decision finds all facts against a plaintiff, the award will
essentially guarantee a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs
Title VII sexual harassment claim. The court explained, "Where an arbitral
determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a
court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the
issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided
by the arbitrator on basis of an adequate record." 130
Similarly, in Darden v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,131 the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment against a Title
VII plaintiff which relied heavily on a grievance arbitration award that had
upheld the plaintiffs discharge. The arbitrator addressed the discrimination
claims in the award. The court opined:
The "great weight" standard was appropriate here since the arbitrator clearly
construed the collective bargaining agreement in accord with Title VII to
proscribe racially discriminatory and retaliatory discharges, and thus fully
considered Darden's Title VII claim. Reviewing the arbitrator's finding that
Illinois Bell had not discharged Darden for either of these illicit reasons,
along with the totality of the evidence.., the district court did not err when
128 Id. at 119; see also Martinez v. Amalgamated Transit UnionLocal 1056, No. 03-
CV-6291, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12252 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (applying Collins);
Norris v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 02 Civ. 6933, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8619
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004) (same).
129 Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
130 Id. at 330 n.6 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21
(1974)) (emphasis added); see also Pender v. Dist. Council 37 AFSCME, 223 F. Supp. 2d
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
131 Darden v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
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it held that Darden had failed to create a genuine dispute as to the real
reason for his discharge. 13 2
Even where an arbitrator refuses to consider the discrimination or other
public law issues in resolving the grievance, the award may preclude the
employee from litigating subsequently. In Umpierre v. SUNY Brockport,133
plaintiff challenged her dismissal as a professor and one-time chair of the
foreign language department at SUNY Brockport under the CBA.134 At the
arbitration hearing, plaintiff, represented by union counsel, charged the
university with retaliating against her activities opposing discrimination and
discriminating against her because of her gender, national origin and sexual
orientation.135 The arbitrator expressly refused to address the discrimination
and retaliation claims, 136 but did find that the university proved all charges
against plaintiff except one and approved its decision to terminate plaintiffs
employment. The university then confirmed plaintiff s dismissal.1 37
Plaintiff sued for alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA. The court
relied on the arbitration award in granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The court considered the arbitrator's failure to address
the discrimination issues immaterial and granted summary judgment because
it concluded that "no rational trier of fact could conclude that SUNY
Brockport fired her for any reason other than because the arbitrator found her
guilty of misconduct."' 138
Although the major weight of authority is against giving grievance
arbitration awards res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
public law litigation, the bar against such preclusive effect is not absolute. A
number of states have given grievance arbitration awards res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect in subsequent common law tort actions.139
Particular circumstances may lead to a court affording a grievance arbitration
132 Id. at 504.
133 Umpierre v. SUNY Brockport, No. 95-CV-887, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14753
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1997).
134 Id. at *1.
135 Id. at *5.
136 Id. at *14 n.4.
137 Id. at *4.
138 Id. at *13.
139 See, e.g., Kelly v. Vons Cos., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
Bulger v. Lieberman, 667 A.2d 561, 562 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Taylor v. People's Gas
Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 141 (111. App. Ct. 1995). But see Taylor v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358, 362-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to give
arbitration award preclusive effect with respect to statutory claims); Camargo v. Cal.
Portland Cement Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
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award res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent statutory
litigation. For example, in Serafin v. Connecticut,140 the plaintiff sued for
violation of the FMLA. The plaintiff had previously grieved her termination
pursuant to her CBA and the arbitrator upheld her discharge. Unlike the
typical CBA, the agreement that covered the plaintiff allowed her to arbitrate
personally without the approval or participation of the union. Plaintiff did so,
was represented at the arbitration by her personal attorney and, by agreement,
paid half of the arbitrator's fee. 141 The court distinguished cases that refused
to give preclusive effect to awards from union-controlled arbitration
procedures and held that the arbitration award precluded plaintiff from
litigating her FMLA claim in court. 142
Thus, labor arbitrators are increasingly being called upon to resolve
public law claims either because courts are compelling employees to submit
those claims to the CBA's arbitration procedure or because unions and
employees are voluntarily doing so. In the next section, we explore the
evolving law of the arbitrator's authority to interpret and apply the public
law.
D. The Evolving Judicial View ofArbitral Authority
The Supreme Court's views concerning arbitral authority to interpret and
apply public law have come a long way in the almost half century since the
Steelworkers Trilogy. In the Trilogy, the Court suggested that arbitrators who
apply the public law rather than the CBA exceed their authority. 143 The
Court reiterated that view in Gardner-Denver.144 Twenty-three years after
the Trilogy, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759,145 the Court
suggested that an arbitrator may recognize supervening illegality as a defense
to a grievance. 146 Fifteen years thereafter, in Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,147 the Court opined that a grievance arbitrator facing a public
law claim is to apply the public law. 148
140 Serafin v. Connecticut, 10 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1120 (D. Conn. Mar. 9,
2005).
141 Id. at 1126.
142 Id. at 1128.
143 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
144 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974).
145 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
146 Id. at 767 n.10.
147 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
148 Id. at 79.
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Lower court views of arbitral authority to interpret and apply public law
external to the CBA have also evolved. In Roadmaster Corp. v. Production
and Maintenance Employees' Local 504,149 a CBA between Roadmaster and
United Employees Union Number One ran through February 28, 1986, and
provided that it would automatically renew from year to year unless one
party gave the other party at least sixty days notice of intent to amend or
terminate it. During the term of the contract, the union struck over wage
concessions demanded by the company, and the company hired over 500
permanent replacements. Simultaneously, the union's membership voted to
merge with Local 771 of the Laborers International Union of North America
(LIUNA). Officers from both unions purported to accept Roadmaster's most
recent offer but the company refused to reinstate the replaced strikers.
Thereafter, the employees voted to form their own LIUNA local and Local
504 was chartered. Roadmaster refused to recognize Local 504.
On December 16, 1985, Roadmaster sent a letter notifying all three
unions of its intent to terminate the CBA effective February 28, 1986.
Roadmaster refused to bargain with any union. Local 504 sued and a court
compelled Roadmaster to arbitrate a number of issues, including whether the
December 16 letter defeated the automatic renewal of the CBA. The
arbitrator held that the letter was void because Roadmaster's refusal to
bargain violated section 8(d)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Consequently, he found that the contract automatically renewed for
another year.
The Seventh Circuit held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and
refused to enforce the award. The court reasoned that the arbitrator based the
award on the NLRA and that he had no authority to do so. The court opined:
The arbitrator cast no doubt upon what he was doing. And he was plainly
wrong. He based his decision not on the parties' bargain, but rather upon his
view of the requirements of enacted legislation. Thus, he has exceeded the
scope of the submission and the award will not be enforced. 150
It is not clear whether the court's restrictive view of the arbitrator's
authority in Roadmaster survives the Supreme Court's charge in Wright that
arbitrators presented with statutory claims are to apply the public law.
Regardless, the Seventh Circuit has more recently taken a more expansive
view of arbitral authority to apply public law without even mentioning
Roadmaster.
149 Roadmaster Corp. v. Prod. & Maint. Employees' Local 504, 851 F.2d 886 (7th
Cir. 1988).
150 Id. at 889 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In Butler Manufacturing Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,151 the
employer discharged an employee pursuant to a negotiated attendance
control plan embodied in a memorandum of understanding between the
employer and the union. The arbitrator determined that three of the absences
for which the grievant had been charged were FMLA-protected and ordered
the grievant reinstated with half back pay. 152 The employer sued to vacate
the award.
The union argued that the award drew its essence from the contract and
cited a provision of the agreement that stated, "Butler Manufacturing
Company offers equal opportunity for employment, advancement in
employment, and continuation of employment to all qualified individuals in
accordance with the provisions of law and in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement for the represented employees covered by it. 1 5 3 The
district court, however, determined the quoted language to be "nothing but
boilerplate anti-discrimination commitments that did not necessarily pull the
FMLA into the agreement,"'154 and held that the arbitrator exceeded her
authority by relying on the FMLA. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court
reasoned:
If there were some kind of "clear statement" rule that applied to CBAs, and
to the match between a CBA and an arbitrator's authority, perhaps [the
district court's analysis] would have been right. But there is no such rule.
Instead... the standard asks only whether the arbitrator's interpretation can
rationally be linked to the CBA. Here, a broader look... demonstrates that
the arbitrator's award did draw its essence from the parties' agreement.
Article 2 paragraph 13 ... does not say only that there will be "equal
opportunity for employment ... in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement .... In the ellipsis between the word "employment" and the
last phrase comes the phrase "in accordance with the provisions of law."
We have no reason to think that this reference to external law is either
surplusage or "mere boilerplate."... We find that Article 2, paragraph 13
conferred on the arbitrator the authority to consider the FMLA. 155
The First Circuit has taken an even more expansive view of arbitral
authority. In Costal Oil of New England, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25,156 the
151 Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 336 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2003).
152 Id. at 632.
153 Id. at 633.
154Id.
155 Id. at 633-34 (citation omitted).
156 Coastal Oil of New England, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 134 F.3d 466 (1st Cir.
1998).
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CBA provided, inter alia, that the employer would either maintain workers'
compensation insurance or provide injured employees with the same benefits
as provided for in the Massachusetts worker's compensation statute. 157 The
CBA covered only one of the employer's three facilities. The same union
represented the employees at the other two facilities, but each facility had its
own CBA.
An employee covered by the CBA was injured on the job. Following his
recovery, he sought reinstatement but was advised that there were no
openings. The union and employer agreed that the employee would be
reinstated to the next available opening. Subsequently, the employee learned
of an opening at one of the other two facilities. When the employer refused to
award him that position, he grieved and the union took the claim to
arbitration.
The arbitrator, relying on the Massachusetts Worker's Compensation
Law, ordered the employer to reinstate the grievant to the position at the
other facility which was covered by a different CBA. The First Circuit
upheld the arbitrator's authority to do so. Relying on Gilmer and its progeny,
the court gave the employer's attack on the arbitrator's authority short shrift:
How can the arbitrator, in determining whether appellant lived up to the
contractual obligations mandated by... the Revere agreement, fail to
address whether the provisions of the Massachusetts Worker's
Compensation Law incorporated into that agreement... have been met?
The response to this question as well as to appellant's challenge to the
arbitrator's authority to interpret the aforementioned Massachusetts statute
is self-evident. Obviously, the arbitrator acted properly and within the scope
of his delegated authority. We can perceive of no valid reason why the
parties could not also agree to have statutory rights enforced before an
arbitral forum. 158
Thus, as grievance arbitrators are called upon with increasing frequency
to adjudicate employees' public law claims, courts are taking an increasingly
expansive view of their authority to do so. We explore the implications of
these developments in the next part.
V. THE ARBITRATOR'S EVOLVING ROLE-MOVING TOWARD GREATER
INDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTIES?
We began this article by using a hypothetical involving the FMLA to
157 Id. at 468.
158 Id. at 469-70.
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introduce the topic. Our choice of the FMLA was deliberate. The FMLA is
having a greater impact on labor arbitration than any other statute or source
of external law.
The FMLA covers employers who employ fifty or more employees on
each regular working day for twenty or more weeks during the current or
preceding calendar year.159 The Act applies to employees who have worked
for their employers for at least twelve months, have worked at least 1250
hours in the preceding twelve months, and are employed at a site where the
employer employs at least fifty employees within a seventy-five mile
radius. 160 Covered employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in
any twelve month period for the birth or adoption of a child, for the
employee's serious health condition, or to care for a spouse, parent or minor
or disabled child who has a serious health condition. 161
The primary impetus for enactment of the FMLA was the need to enable
employees to take time off from work following the birth or adoption of a
child without worrying about job security or health insurance. In practice,
however, leave following birth or adoption of a child accounts for a small
minority of FMLA leaves that are taken. The Department of Labor's 2000
surveys, the most recent data available, reflect the following: 162
Reasons for Taking Leave Across All Leaves
Taken in Previous 18 Months: 2000 Survey
Reason For Leave Percent of Leave-Takers
Own Health 52.4%
Maternity-Disability 7.9%
Care for New Born,
Newly Adopted, or Newly 18.5%
Placed Foster Child
Care for ill child 11.5%
Care for ill spouse 6.4%
Care for ill parent 13.0%
159 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (2000). Employees are counted as long as they are on the
payroll on a given workday. They need not be physically working that day.
Consequently, part-time employees are counted the same as full-time employees. See
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997).
160 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
161 Id. § 2612(a)(1).
16 2 DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMiLmS AND EMPLOYERS: THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURvEYS, 2000 UPDATE § 2.1.2 tbl.2.3 (2001), available at
http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041118135126/www.dol.gov/asp/fnla/chapter2.htn.
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Thus, the majority of leave-takers took leave for their own health conditions.
Fewer than 20 percent took leave to care for a newborn, newly adopted or
newly placed foster child. (The table also shows 7.9 percent took leave for
maternity-disability. The table totals exceed 100 percent because of overlap
and, presumably, the maternity-disability leave takers overlap with leave
takers to care for a newborn child.)
Not surprisingly, most litigation has concerned leaves taken or sought for
serious health conditions. This is because most leaves are taken or sought for
serious health conditions. It also is because determining whether an
employee qualifies for leave for a serious health condition is more complex
than determining whether an employee qualifies for leave following the birth
or adoption of a child. In the latter case one simply determines whether the
employee has worked the requisite period of time and works in a covered
facility and whether the employee has had or adopted a child within the past
twelve months. On the other hand, the term "serious health condition" is
ambiguous. It clearly covers open heart-surgery and clearly does not cover a
skinned knee. However, whether it covers illnesses whose severity is
between skinned knees and open-heart surgery is open to debate. For
example, under some circumstances an ear infection or the flu may be a
serious health condition, 163 while under other circumstances they will not
be. 164 One court has held that a case of eczema was not a serious health
condition, 165 while another held that an ulcer was. 166 It is not surprising that
a survey of appellate court FMLA decisions issued between December 1994
and October 1999 found that 25 percent concerned the seriousness of the
employee's illness and 6 percent concerned the seriousness of the illness of
the employee's family member. 167
The FMLA also gives greater rights to employees taking serious health
condition leave than to those taking childbirth or adoption leave. For
example, whereas employees may take leave intermittently or on a reduced
schedule following childbirth or adoption only with the consent of their
employers, they have a right to intermittent or reduced leave for their or a
163 See Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2001) (flu); Caldwell v.
Holland of Tex., Inc., 208 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2000) (ear infection).
164 See Henderson v. Cent. Progressive Bank, 83 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,215
(E.D. La. 2002) (flu); Seidle v. Providant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (ear infection).
165 Beal v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. Iowa
1997).
166 Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., !28 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1997).
167 STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
WORK AND FAMILY IN AMERICA 172 tbl.7.6 (2001).
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family member's serious health condition whenever medically necessary. 168
Absenteeism presents one of the most frequent discipline problems
encountered by employers. 169 Employers frequently respond with attendance
control plans that assess occurrence points for absence, tardiness, early
departure, and failure to notify of an absence or anticipated late arrival.
Discipline is imposed at increasingly severe levels upon accumulation of
specified point totals. However, Department of Labor regulations expressly
provide: "[E]mployers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions... nor can FMLA leave be counted under 'no
fault' attendance policies."' 170
Discipline and discharge for attendance infractions constitute a
significant portion of labor arbitrators' dockets. 171 In hearing these cases,
arbitrators inevitably run headlong into the FMLA.
Recall Mittenthal and Bloch's suggestion that arbitrators consider
"implications"-the existing conditions surrounding the collective
bargaining agreement-in order to preserve the parties' bargain. 172 In
attendance discipline and discharge cases these implications include the
simple fact that an employer cannot operate its attendance plan anymore
without significantly taking into account the FMLA, and, therefore, it does
not make sense to operate the disciplinary system as if this elephant were not
standing in the middle of the room. Regardless of whether one agrees with
Howlett's general contention that the law is incorporated into every contract,
the FMLA is clearly implicated-and with increasing frequency expressly
incorporated-into every contract's just cause provision. Consequently, the
most recent edition of the leading treatise on labor arbitration observes, "In
the majority of cases involving the FMLA, arbitrators rely on the provisions
of the FMLA and the Department of Labor regulations without regard to
whether the collective bargaining agreement says anything about the
FMLA."173
When arbitrators adjudicate a grievant's FMLA rights, do they remain
solely the parties' designated contract reader and therefore governed by the
parties' expectations in the manner that arbitrators and scholars from Dean
Shulman forward have ascribed? Or are they beginning to assume a more
168 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (2000).
169 See Barbara Zausner Tener & Ann Gosline, Absenteeism and Tardiness, in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 17.01l] (Tim Bornstein et al. eds., 2d ed.
2005).
170 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005).
171 See Tener & Gosline, supra note 169, at § 17.01[1].
172 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
173 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 520.
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public role, a role somewhat independent of the parties? One arbitrator has
expressly disclaimed the independent role. After finding that the outcome of
a discharge grievance turned on whether the grievant's tardiness was FMLA-
protected, he wrote, "[E]ven if the arbitrator misconstrues the law, the parties
have bargained for his interpretation of the statute when the law was
incorporated by reference in the collective bargaining agreement. In a sense,
the arbitrator is not defining the law. He is interpreting the contract." 174
In Wright, the Supreme Court indicated that when adjudicating a
grievant's statutory claim, an arbitrator is to apply the public law rather than
the contract. 175 However, in Wright the Court may have viewed the claim as
solely a statutory claim, and not a mixed contractual/statutory claim. The
Court described the dispute as one that "ultimately concerns not the
application or interpretation of any CBA, but the meaning of a federal
statute." 176 Regardless of whether one agrees with the Court's assessment of
that claim, that was the factual basis upon which the Court concluded that the
question for the arbitrator in such a case is what federal law requires, and not
what the parties agreed to.
In most grievances in which the FMLA is raised in arbitration, the issue
will be a mixed one. The issue submitted to the arbitrator by the parties is
still likely to be whether there was just cause to discipline or discharge the
grievant, and the FMLA claim will be raised as part of that issue. In such a
case, is the arbitrator still acting within a solely private context? When the
FMLA is raised in a discipline case, there is more pressure for arbitrators to
"get the law right," i.e. to pay attention to legal precedent and regulations,
than there has been in the past. Recall Arbitrator Bloch's suggestion in his
2000 speech on just cause that the arbitrator can simply pay attention to the
overall purpose of a law when deciding just cause issues, rather than being
bound by their specifics in every detail.' 77 The FMLA prohibits employer
interference, restraint, or denial of leave rights, and the Department of Labor
regulations make clear that disciplining an employee for taking FMLA-
protected leave violates this provision. The question of whether a disciplinary
action that is the subject of the grievance unlawfully interfered with FMLA
rights is inextricably tied to what exactly is protected leave. That question, in
turn, will almost undoubtedly depend upon legal precedent. Thus, the nature
of the FMLA and its interaction with the contractual just cause provision
binds the arbitrator to the specific details of the law.
174 Chicago Tribune Co.,119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1007, 1013 n.15 (2003)
(Nathan, Arb.).
175 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79 (1998).
176 Id. at 78-79.
177 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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The obligation to get the law right is not new to arbitrators. Arbitrators
adjudicating grievances within the federal sector have an independent
obligation to get the law right, an obligation enforced by the FLRA. In
attendance grievances in all sectors, advocates increasingly are introducing in
arbitration the extensive and complex federal regulations governing the
FMLA. When they do so, arbitrators may be more likely to treat such
regulations as controlling, as an arbitrator would in the federal sector, and not
simply as sources that may persuade but do not bind.
The question remains as to what the arbitrator should do if the parties do
not raise sections of the FMLA law, the regulations or legal precedent that
the arbitrator believes may be implicated. The need for the arbitrator to get
the law right may be stronger with regard to the FMLA than with regard to
any other external law that arbitrators have addressed in the past. This need is
particularly strong when we realize that, either as a matter of law or as a
practical matter, the arbitrator's award likely will preclude litigation of the
grievant's statutory claim.178 This need imposes on arbitrators an obligation
to know as much about the law as they can. This obligation may in part be
independent of the parties and extends to conducting necessary legal research
beyond materials cited or supplied by the parties. The arbitrator raising the
issues on her own or conducting independent research, however, may bring
herself into conflict with the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes which provides, "The extent, if
any, to which an arbitrator properly may rely on precedent, on guidance of
other awards, or on independent research is dependent primarily on the
policies of the parties on these matters, as expressed in the contract, or other
agreement, or at the hearing."' 179 However, meeting the implied expectations
of the parties, or perhaps the mandates of certain courts, may require
arbitrators to contravene this Code section with regard to the FMLA. To the
extent that this Code provision is inconsistent with the arbitral obligation to
178 See supra notes 126-142 and accompanying text. Even before Gilmer and
Wright, an unsuccessful grievant stood a very small chance of succeeding in subsequent
statutory litigation. A survey in the early 1980s found that of 1,761 arbitration awards
involving issues related to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, grievants litigated their
Title VII claims in court in 307 cases, but obtained a result different from the arbitration
award in only 21 cases. Thus, a grievant who lost a discrimination claim in arbitration
had only a slightly better than one in 100 chance of prevailing in litigation. Lamont
Stallworth & Michele Hoyman, The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the
Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 49, 55.
179 CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES § 2(G)(1)(a) (1975) (amended 2003), available at
http://www.naarb.org/code.html. The Code is the joint effort of, and has been adopted by,
the American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
and the National Academy of Arbitrators.
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get the law right, it may require amendment.
But what of the problem of ungrieved prior discipline used to introduce
this article? An employee discharged under an employer's attendance control
plan was previously suspended for absences that were FMLA-protected.
However, the employee did not grieve the prior suspension. The time for
filing a grievance as set forth in the CBA has long since past, but the two
year limitations period for filing an FMLA claim has not elapsed. Should the
arbitrator follow the well-established arbitral practice that prior discipline
that was not grieved is not subject to attack, or should the arbitrator allow the
union and grievant to assert that the prior discipline violated the FMLA?
Five years ago an arbitrator might have concluded that the employer
expected the arbitrator to follow the well-established arbitral practice and
refuse to consider the attack on the prior suspension. The union might have
argued that the arbitrator should consider the FMLA violation, but the
union's expectations also probably included the possibility that the arbitrator
would refuse to hear the attack on the suspension. To the extent that there
was a mutual expectation of the parties, it would probably have led the
arbitrator to refuse to hear the FMLA attack on the prior suspension.180
The parties' expectations, however, are evolving. Parties cannot ignore
the overwhelming influence of the FMLA on the administration of
attendance policies, and they also cannot ignore the law's influence on
administration of the CBA. Wright suggests that the prior ungrieved
discipline is subject to attack if it rests on absences that were FMLA-
protected. Wright holds that waiver of a statutory entitlement in the collective
bargaining process, of which the grievance process is a part, should be found
only when it is clear and unmistakable. 18 1 Failure to grieve the suspension
certainly waived the claim that the suspension lacked just cause under the
CBA. However, failure to grieve the suspension cannot be said to provide a
clear and unmistakable waiver of the grievant's FMLA rights, as long as the
statute of limitations on the FMLA claim has yet to run. Indeed, courts have
struck down contractual provisions that purported to reduce the time for
filing a statutory claim below the statutory limitations period. 182 Thus, the
arbitrator should hear the claim that the prior suspension violated the FMLA
and that, to the extent the discharge rested on the prior illegal suspension, it
cannot be for just cause. However, the arbitrator should refuse to hear any
180 This would have been the "safe" course for the arbitrator to follow to preserve
future acceptability to the parties.
181 Wright, 525 U.S. at 82.
182 For discussion of this issue see Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By
How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 589,
615-17 (2001).
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claim that the prior suspension violated the contract independent of the
FMLA. For example, the arbitrator should continue to refuse to consider a
claim that an earlier discipline for tardiness resulted from a defective time
clock.
In considering the FMLA attack on the prior suspension, the arbitrator is
heeding the "implications" discussed by Mittenthal and Bloch, in the context
of the FMLA. Such incremental movements in the arbitrator's approach to
statutory issues reflect the evolving process that characterizes the arbitrator's
role. They also reflect an evolving analysis of what the parties' expectations
are.
Of course, the external law, i.e. the FMLA, is only one element for the
arbitrator to consider in determining whether there was just cause for
discipline or discharge. However, in cases where the discipline or discharge
rests on a foundation violative of the FMLA, it will usually be the
determinative element because the parties now accept that disciplinary action
that violates the FMLA cannot be for just cause.
With arbitrators delving deeper and more frequently into the law because
of the FMLA, will judicial deference traditionally awarded to arbitration
erode, as David Feller suggested in his lamenting the end of the Golden Age
of arbitration? 183 If the primary issue is still just cause, then perhaps the long-
standing view of arbitration as essentially a private process prevails, even
though the arbitrator may be forging ever deeper into the interpretation of
public law. One of this article's authors has called for de novo judicial
review of arbitral interpretations of public law and argued that such review
will not undermine the finality of arbitration awards. 184 Courts, however,
have not gone down this path and are unlikely to do so. 185 The generally
lenient standards of judicial review may place even greater pressure on
arbitrators to get the law right, as no higher authority is likely to correct their
mistakes.
Feller certainly was correct that the CBA is no longer the sole or clearly
dominant source of the law governing the workplace. Thus, to the extent that
the public law that regulates the workplace is interwoven with the CBA and
to the extent that arbitrators are expected to interpret and apply the public law
correctly, the labor arbitration process moves away from its traditional
characterization as a purely private process and becomes quasi-public. The
arbitrator's role thus evolves into a quasi-public one where statutory claims
183 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
184 Malin & Ladenson, supra note 30, at 1226-38.
185 For an excellent discussion of judicial review of arbitral errors of law, see
Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J
(forthcoming 2005).
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are at issue. However, as discussed above, the parties' expectations are also
evolving to encompass this quasi-public role of the labor arbitrator.
V. CONCLUSION
The title of this symposium is, "A Collision of Two Ideals: Legal Ethics
and the World of ADR." With respect to labor arbitration the symposium title
conjures up images of Judge Paul Hayes' largely discredited critique of the
arbitral ethic of party control. 186 Hayes caricatured the notion of the
"arbitrator as a creature of the parties," as "a marionette operated by them, a
ventriloquist's dummy."' 187 He continued, "This attitude... is that the
arbitrator is the obedient servant of those who hire him and owes nothing
whatever to the public interest or to the ends of justice. Worse than that, the
attitude reflects faithlessness toward those whose interest he is pretending to
protect."1 88
Hayes' critique has been discredited by the test of time. In traditional
grievance arbitration, the arbitrator as a creature of the parties has served the
public interest by playing a crucial role in the parties' system of workplace
self-government.
In the twenty-first century workplace, in which public regulation plays
such a prominent role, the Hayes' critique may be raised in a new form as a
potential collision between the arbitrator's traditional role as a creature of the
parties and the arbitrator's ethical responsibility to adjudicate grievants'
statutory claims in accordance with public law. Certainly the potential for
such a collision has been present for some time but, as discussed in this
article, we believe that the collision is turning out to be at most a near miss.
As the arbitrator's role is evolving so too are the expectations of the parties.
This evolution is most evident in grievances that raise issues under the
FMLA. The FMLA may be changing the parties' expectations towards a
general expectation that arbitrators will apply the public law and get it right
when issues of public law are adjudicated through the grievance process.
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